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RIGS-TO-REEFS:  
REFOCUSING THE DEBATE IN CALIFORNIA 
DAN ROTHBACH* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Off the coast of Santa Barbara, they glow like Christmas trees in 
the night sky.  Oil platforms, rising up from the ocean floor, help 
quench a nation’s thirst for energy.  Ironically, these giant ocean 
structures also attract a myriad of sea life, creating small but thriving 
ecosystems.  Because of this, a growing debate is emerging between 
those who wish to see the rigs disappear entirely and those who 
believe that doing so would destroy an important habitat.  The latter 
propose converting the rigs, once oil production ceases, into artificial 
reefs, a plan appropriately known as rigs-to-reefs. 
II.  OFFSHORE OIL DRILLING AND  
THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Any exploration into the legal framework surrounding the rigs-
to-reefs debate must start with a historical purview of offshore oil 
drilling in the United States.  Offshore oil and gas exploration began 
in earnest in the 1890s, and the drilling of the first oil well occurred in 
1896 off the coast of Summerland, California, in Santa Barbara 
County.1  Unlike the modern visage of a giant platform seemingly 
suspended in the ocean, this early drilling operation consisted of a 
series of wooden piers extending from the coast out into the ocean.2  
Coastal oil exploration remained in its infancy, limited to the 
Summerland model, until 1938.  That year marked the construction of 
the first drilling platform in unprotected waters, located in the Gulf of 
 
 * Candidate for Juris Doctorate, Duke Law School (2007). 
 1. U.S.  DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING OIL AND GAS 
RESOURCES: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 2 (2005), available at http://www.mms.gov/ld/PDFs/ 
GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf. 
 2. Dwight E.  Sanders, California State Lands Commission: Decommissioning Policy and 
Regulations, in Decommissioning and Removal of Oil and Gas Facilities Offshore California: 
Recent Experiences and Future Deepwater Challenges 16, 16 (Frank Manago & Bonnie 
Williamson, eds., 1997). 
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Mexico.3  For the first half-century, offshore oil drilling progressed 
unimpeded. 
The first major conflict in the forum of oil exploration involved a 
jurisdictional battle between the federal government and the affected 
coastal states in 1945.  In a post-war world, it became evident that 
unimpeded access to a constant supply of energy was a matter of 
national security.  President Truman recognized the potential oil 
supply present in the continental shelf off the coast of the United 
States.4  At the same time, the President recognized the jurisdictional 
uncertainty associated with coastal oil exploration, and thus 
proclaimed that the federal government retained territorial control 
over shelf lands bounding the United States coasts.5  To assert its 
rights, two years later the United States brought a trespass action 
against the State of California.6  The federal government alleged that 
California had negotiated leases for oil and gas exploration rights on 
continental shelf lands over which the state lacked jurisdiction.7  
California claimed authority over submerged lands three miles 
offshore, in part on the basis of the equal footing doctrine.8  The court 
held, in line with the Presidential Proclamation of 1945, that the 
United States retained sole jurisdiction over all lands beneath the 
ocean, not limited to the three-mile boundary asserted by California.9  
This holding was extended with respect to oil drilling and exploration 
in Louisiana10 and Texas11 in 1950.  In dictum, however, the court 
recognized the right of Congress to cede jurisdiction to the states.12  In 
recognition of the need for clarity regarding offshore territory, 
Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act.13  The central feature of 
the Act was to define the seaward boundary of coastal states as three 
 
 3. U.S.  DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 1, at 3. 
 4. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Oct. 1, 1945). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See United States v. California, 332 U.S.  19 (1947), superseded by statute, Submerged 
Lands Act, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953). 
 7. Id. at 23. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 40-41. 
 10. See United States v. Lousiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), superseded by statute, Submerged 
Lands Act, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953). 
 11. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), superseded by statute, Submerged 
Lands Act, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953). 
 12. Id. at 40. 
 13. Ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (1953). 
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miles offshore,14 effectively returning to the states what was lost in the 
prior Supreme Court decisions.  This legislation was intended to 
promote the exploration of offshore energy resources.15  The 
Submerged Lands Act provided states with the ability to continue 
leasing activities that they had already begun.  However, a true 
federal legal regime governing offshore oil exploration rights was 
created in a companion bill, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
(OCSLA).16 
Despite an intent to encourage oil exploration, the Submerged 
Lands Act did not contain any provisions governing the leasing or 
development of the involved submerged lands.  Instead, it merely 
created jurisdictional boundaries between the states and the federal 
government.17  With the enactment of the OCSLA, however, 
Congress opened the door for expansive development of the outer 
continental shelf.  The OCSLA authorized the Secretary of the 
Interior to sell exploration leases to the highest competitive bidder.18  
The first such sale took place in 1954,19 and resultant sales now 
produce nearly $5 billion in annual revenue for the federal 
government.20  In its original form, the OCSLA had a very limited 
scope and intent.  The stated purpose of the legislation was solely to 
allow the United States to lease oil exploration rights, and nothing 
more.21  Rules governing the manner of drilling were similarly limited.  
Original leases were to contain a provision requiring that operations 
be conducted in accordance to “sound and efficient oilfield 
practice,”22 a nebulous clause at best.  Despite these limited measures, 
the environmental impacts of offshore drilling were not immediately 
apparent.  Aside from the general issue of dropping tons of steel into 
the ocean, the first decade post-OCSLA was free from noticeable 
environmental harm. 
The rosy picture of offshore drilling received a sharp jolt in 1969.  
In January of that year, Union Oil, under an exploration lease from 
the United States, began drilling a mile below the ocean surface off 
 
 14. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (2000). 
 15. H.R. REP. NO. 83-215, at 2 (1953), as reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1385, 1386. 
 16. Ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (1953). 
 17. H.R. REP. NO. 83-413, at 1 (1953), as reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2177, 2177. 
 18. Id. at 4. 
 19. U.S.  DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 1, at 5. 
 20. Id. 
 21. H.R. REP. NO. 83-413, at 1. 
 22. Id. at 4. 
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the coast of Santa Barbara, California.  The boring breached a high-
pressure oil pocket, causing an explosion at the site and lead to oil 
“congealing into a chocolate mousse mat a foot thick.”23  This 
calamity had the immediate impact of spurring the passage of the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).24  In enacting 
NEPA, Congress recognized a lack of knowledge of the surrounding 
ocean ecosystem, a notion impressed upon the legislature by the 
aforementioned oil spill.25  At its core, NEPA requires federal 
agencies to produce an environmental impact statement (EIS) 
whenever they propose a major federal action.26  However, it was 
unclear from the original language of the statute whether the lease of 
oil exploration rights was covered. 
In 1978, Congress made the question moot when it passed 
amendments to the OCSLA.27  From an environmental standpoint, 
these amendments represent the current state of the law governing 
the leasing of offshore oil exploration rights.  The 1978 amendments 
specifically state that if a plan for development and exploration of 
offshore oil resources is a major federal action, then an EIS must be 
produced.28  Taking the plain meaning of the statute, a development 
and exploration plan could conceptually be a nonmajor federal action 
and thus not subject NEPA’s requirements.29  However, as a practical 
matter, all plans for oil exploration in the outer continental shelf are 
captured by NEPA and considered major federal actions. 
Pursuant to its authority to grant leases under the OCSLA, the 
Department of the Interior created the Minerals Management Service 
(MMS) in 1982 to oversee the development of the outer continental 
shelf.30  In granting a lease, the MMS takes the first step of publishing 
a notice of intent to prepare an EIS in the Federal Register.31  When 
preparing the notice, MMS is forced to look at alternatives to the 
leasing proposal while also analyzing any adverse environmental 
 
 23. Gary Polakovic, Legacy of an Offshore Disaster: Thirty Years After Santa Barbara Spill, 
New Battles Arise as Big Oil Moves Out and Little Oil Moves in, L.A. Times, Jan. 28, 1999, at 
A1. 
 24. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852. 
 25. H.R. REP. NO. 91-378, at 5, as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2751, 2755. 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000). 
 27. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat.  629. 
 28. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(f) (2000). 
 29. See 43 U.S.C. § 1351(g) (2000). 
 30. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 1, at 51. 
 31. Id. at 16. 
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impacts that drilling may create.32  One other aspect of the lease 
agreements is fundamental for purposes of this paper.  When a leased 
field can no longer produce oil in an economical manner, all 
equipment must be removed from the site, both above and below the 
sea.33  However, the issue of what to do with abandoned oil rigs is not 
closed by this lease term. 
One final piece of Congressional legislation is essential to 
understanding the rigs-to-reefs debate.  In 1984, Congress enacted the 
National Fishing Enhancement Act (NFEA).34  Looking purely at the 
act title, the NFEA seems to have little to do with issues involving the 
decommissioning of offshore oil rigs.  The Act is intended to help 
stem the tide of fishery degradation in the United States.35  To achieve 
this goal, Congress sought to encourage the construction of artificial 
reefs as fish habitats to help promote a replenishment of fish stocks.36  
Pursuant to this mission, the NFEA directs various federal agencies 
to consult together in the creation of a National Artificial Reef Plan.37  
The plan notes a preference toward the construction of new artificial 
reefs.38  However, the plan also recognizes the effectiveness of some 
“secondary use materials” already in place for other purposes.  
Inclusive among “secondary use materials” are oil rigs, considered to 
be de facto reefs under the plan.39  Based on this, MMS created a 
national rigs-to-reefs program.40 
III.  RIGS-TO-REEFS: IN PRACTICE 
Rigs-to-reefs is a national program.  However, its current 
application has been anything but comprehensive.  From an ease of 
use standpoint for oil rig operators, it would make sense for MMS to 
administer the details of the rigs-to-reefs program on a uniform basis 
nationwide.  However, it is clear that offshore exploration is an area 
where the federal government has been very deferential to the states.  
 
 32. Id. at 18-19. 
 33. Id. at 40. 
 34. Pub. L. No. 98-623, 98 Stat. 3394. 
 35. 33 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (2000). 
 36. 33 U.S.C. § 2101(b) (2000). 
 37. 33 U.S.C. § 2103 (2000). 
 38. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., DRAFT NATIONAL ARTIFICIAL REEF PLAN 
REVISION 23 (2002), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/irf/NARP.PDF. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Rigs-to-Reefs Information (2005), http://www.gomr.mms.gov/ 
homepg/regulate/environ/rigs-to-reefs/information.html. 
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To that end, MMS requires individual states to implement unique, 
state-specific artificial reef plans, subject to MMS approval.  
Currently, only two states have established an approved program: 
Louisiana in 198641 and Texas in 1990.42  However, the Gulf of 
Mexico, where these plans operate, includes the vast majority of 
offshore oil rigs in the United States.  By 1998, 5,654 oil platforms had 
been in production at one time in the Gulf.43  Of those, 3,930 were still 
active.  In comparison, as of 2006, only 43 platforms are actively 
producing oil off the coast of Southern California.44  Of the 1,715 
retired Gulf of Mexico platforms, 128 were converted to artificial 
reefs.45  The rigs-to-reefs program in the Gulf, despite this slow start, 
is considered a success for the purpose of enhancing fishing 
prospects.46 
The story in California is much different.  In 2001, the Assembly 
and the Senate both approved Senate Bill 1 (SB 1), legislation that 
would have created an artificial reef plan similar to those in the Gulf 
States.47  However, the governor vetoed the bill, with a note praising 
the reasonableness of the provisions but claiming that the lack of 
conclusive scientific evidence made such a proposal premature.48  
Soon, however, twelve of Southern California’s forty-three active oil 
rigs will stop producing oil and have to be decommissioned, bringing 
the rigs-to-reefs debate back to the forefront.49 
IV.  THE STAKEHOLDERS: AN ANALYSIS 
The uniqueness of the rigs-to-reefs problem is most readily seen 
by the divergent interests groups involved.  As seen in the defeat of 
SB 1, the rigs-to-reefs issue has resulted in a number of unlikely 
alliances, with commercial fishermen joining forces with 
 
 41. See generally La. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, Artificial Reef Program (2005), 
http://www.wlf.state.la.us/licenses/permits/artificialreefprogram. 
 42. See generally Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, Artificial Reefs Program (2005), 
http://www.tpwd.state.tx.us/landwater/water/habitats/artificial_reef/artreef.phtml. 
 43. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Artificial Reefs: Oases for Marine Life in the Gulf (2005), 
http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/regulate/environ/rigs-to-reefs/artificial-reefs.html. 
 44. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., STATUS OF LEASES AND QUALIFIED COMPANIES: PACIFIC 
OCS REGION 24 (2006). 
 45. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., supra note 43. 
 46. LES DAUTERIVE, RIGS-TO-REEFS POLICY, PROGRESS, AND PERSPECTIVE 4 (2000), 
available at http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/whatsnew/publicat/recpub/2000-073.pdf. 
 47. Cal. SB 1 (2001). 
 48. Gray Davis, Veto Message, Cal. SB 1 (2001). 
 49. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., supra note 44, at 23. 
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environmental advocacy groups, pitted against oil companies and 
recreational fishers.  Understanding the motivations of these 
stakeholders is essential to developing a coherent understanding of 
the rigs-to-reefs debate. 
A. Oil Companies 
The most obviously affected groups in creating a rigs-to-reefs 
program are the entities that own the offshore oil platforms.  Prior to 
the NFEA, oil rig owners had only one option when oil production 
ceased: complete dismantling of the offshore facilities.  The notable 
disadvantage of this option is the expense involved.  The cost of 
leaving something in the ocean is significantly less than the cost of 
removing it from the ocean, especially as the depth of the water 
increases.  However, absent an alternative, these costs will be borne 
entirely upon the oil companies.  From an equitable standpoint, 
however, it seems unnecessary to grant the platform owners relief 
from the costs of platform removal.  Because the original leases 
anticipated removal once production ceased, it should also be fair to 
assume that oil companies budgeted accordingly.  Their treatment in 
currently existing rigs-to-reefs programs seems to bear out this 
opinion.  MMS currently requires oil companies to donate half of 
their cost savings from leaving structures in place to state agencies, as 
a means to finance the artificial reef programs.50 
Another important consideration for oil companies is flexibility.  
There is an industry push to continue the current trend of allowing 
individual platform operators a choice as to whether to fully 
deconstruct a rig or leave parts in place as an artificial reef.  The 
industry has tried to emphasize that each oil rig possesses site-specific 
differences that require analysis of many factors before decisions are 
made.51  The interests of oil companies can then be narrowed down to 
two specific points: cost certainty and operational flexibility. 
B. Fishermen 
Fishermen straddle the rigs-to-reefs issue.  On one side sits the 
recreational fisher, who sees the artificial reef as a boon because it 
 
 50. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., supra note 43. 
 51. David Tyler, Oil and Gas Industry Perspective Regarding Environmental Effects During 
Decommissioning, in Decommissioning and Removal of Oil and Gas Facilities Offshore 
California: Recent Experiences and Future Deepwater Challenges 177, 177 (Frank Manago & 
Bonnie Williamson, eds., 1997). 
05__ROTHBACH.DOC 8/17/2007  9:24 AM 
290 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 17:283 
provides a localized environment to facilitate his activities.  On the 
other side lie the commercial fishermen, who, in California, depend 
mostly on trawling to sustain their livelihood. 
Recreational fishermen provide potentially the strongest support 
for rigs-to-reefs among all interested parties.  The National Fishing 
Enhancement Act is proof enough, as its chief intent is to improve 
fish stocks for recreational fishers.  In the California case, recreational 
fishermen have been quick to point out two things.  First, artificial 
reefs present a significant opportunity for the growth of local fish 
populations.52  This might be attractive to recreational fishermen 
because it is easier to catch large amounts of fish when they all 
congregate in the same place.  The other reason emphasized is that 
recreational fishing generates significant revenue.  Recreational 
fishers estimate that in 1992, their industry added nearly $5 billion to 
the California economy, which is a non-trivial amount.53  It is unclear, 
however, how either converting oil rigs into artificial reefs or 
removing them altogether would affect these figures. 
On the other side are commercial fishermen.  The commercial 
fishing industry in California has been categorically opposed to the 
rigs-to-reefs proposal.  Most commercial fishing in California employs 
trawlers, which risk getting caught on underwater structures, causing 
damage to fishing equipment.54 There is also a sense, among 
commercial fishermen, that the rigs-to-reefs deal is conceptually 
biased toward recreational fishermen, thus limiting their desire to 
accept rigs-to-reefs as a proposal.55 
C. Environmental Groups 
Environmental groups could be the potentially most ambiguous 
stakeholders.  If artificial reefs do enhance fish populations, and total 
rig removal destroys fish habitat, then the rigs-to-reefs program 
presents an environmentally satisfactory alternative to total removal.  
 
 52. Daniel Frumkes, United Anglers of Southern California / American Sportfishing 
Association Perspective, in Decommissioning and Removal of Oil and Gas Facilities Offshore 
California: Recent Experiences and Future Deepwater Challenges 184, 184 (Frank Manago & 
Bonnie Williamson, eds., 1997). 
 53. Id. at 190. 
 54. Southern California Trawlers Association Perspective, in Decommissioning and 
Removal of Oil and Gas Facilities Offshore California: Recent Experiences and Future 
Deepwater Challenges 182, 182 (Frank Manago & Bonnie Williamson, eds., 1997). 
 55. Chris Miller, Santa Barbara Lobster Trappers Perspective, in Decommissioning and 
Removal of Oil and Gas Facilities Offshore California: Recent Experiences and Future 
Deepwater Challenges 181, 181 (Frank Manago & Bonnie Williamson, eds., 1997). 
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However, environmental groups have sought to frame the debate not 
in terms of fish populations, but instead in terms of distrusting oil 
companies.  In supporting the veto of SB 1, one activist described the 
legislative victory as not letting oil companies “get off the hook” for 
rig removal as required under the initial lease terms.56  The 
environmental lobby’s stance does not derive from a desire to 
preserve fish habitat, but instead from a desire to limit oil exploration 
off the California coast, noting that while some exploration cannot be 
stopped, they at least hold out hope for complete removal of the 
offshore structures once production ceases.57  To align interests in the 
most beneficial way, then, it seems that the framework of the debate 
must change to bring the environmental lobby on board. 
D. Fish 
Fish represent the most important yet most ignored stakeholder 
in the rigs-to-reefs debate.  None of the stakeholders discussed above 
seem to recognize the interests of fish as living entities.  The oil 
companies and environmental groups, pitted across from one another, 
seem to ignore fish all together.  The fishermen, on the other hand, 
see fish only as an economic unit.  The problem is that a number of 
fish species located near the California oil rigs are overfished and 
subject to a Fishery Management Plan.58 A study conducted by Dr.  
Milton Love of fish populations in and around the Santa Barbara oil 
rigs found that significant amounts of various species of rockfish 
inhabited the underwater structures of the oil rigs.  Importantly, Love 
found significant populations juvenile rockfish at the rigs.59  A specific 
species, bocaccio, have been identified as a “Species of Concern” by 
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) since 1999.60  Essential 
to the successful recovery of the bocaccio, as well as other fish 
populations is the survival of juveniles.  To this extent, proposed 
 
 56. Miguel Bustillo & John Johnson, Governor Davis Gets Busy With His Green Pen, L.A.  
Times, Oct. 14, 2001, at California 1. 
 57. Nichole Camozzi, Platform Abandonment and the Santa Barbara Channel, in 
Decommissioning and Removal of Oil and Gas Facilities Offshore California: Recent 
Experiences and Future Deepwater Challenges 173, 173 (Frank Manago & Bonnie Williamson, 
eds., 1997). 
 58. See generally MILTON S. LOVE, DONNA M.  SCHROEDER, & MARY NISHIMOTO, THE 
ECOLOGICAL ROLE OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION PLATFORMS AND NATURAL OUTCROPS 
ON FISHES IN SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL CALIFORNIA: A SYNTHESIS OF INFORMATION (2003). 
 59. Id. at 3-1. 
 60. NOAA NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., SPECIES OF CONCERN: BOCACCIO 1 (2007), 
available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/species/bocaccio_detailed.pdf. 
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changes to the Pacific Fisheries Management Plan include 
categorizing oil platforms as “Habitat Areas of Particular Concern” 
for the rockfish.61  Clearly, then, the focus should be on the fish. 
V.  TOWARD AN OUTCOME:  
CONSOLIDATING INTERESTS THROUGH PRECAUTION 
The rigs-to-reefs debate, at its core, is an amalgamation of 
interests that are not as divergent as they appear.  Oil companies 
want to achieve financial savings by avoiding total removal of 
offshore rigs.  Commercial fishermen want to be able to fish without 
the risk of catching equipment on submerged structures.  
Environmental groups distrust the oil companies and fear a lack of 
liability for unanticipated problems.  Recreational fishermen want the 
opportunity to catch greater numbers of fish.  Fish, to the extent that 
they are cognizant of their interests, want to grow in numbers. 
The failure to reach an agreement thus far can in part be blamed 
on a lack of understanding about what is at stake.  There seems to be 
a tendency among the anti-rigs-to-reefs contingent to view the natural 
ocean environment as the way it was prior to offshore oil exploration.  
Assumptions are made that oil rigs have actually displaced fish from 
their natural habitat rather than actually growing the current fish 
stocks.  There is also a rhetorical battle being waged that undermines 
comprise.  When the program is derogatorily referred to as “rigs-to-
grief” or “rigs-to-rubbish,” critical dialogue seems far-fetched.62  This 
view also ignores the reality of the situation: the oil rigs are there, and 
the fish flock to them. 
The debate needs to be shifted away from what we do not know 
and toward what we do know.  What is known is that juvenile fish 
populations around offshore oil rigs are significant.  Love goes so far 
as to describe the oil rigs as “nursery grounds” for overfished species 
of rockfish.63  The precautionary principle would likely hold that, if 
these rigs are removed, it is unknown what the long term effect on 
rockfish populations will be.  It seems probable, though, that 
removing the oil rigs would in essence destroy the juvenile rockfish 
stocks, and inevitably accelerate the decline of an already at-risk 
fishery.  By framing the debate in terms of preserving the fishery, it 
 
 61. 71 Fed. Reg. 1,998 (Jan. 12, 2006). 
 62. Kenneth R. Weiss, ‘Rigs to Reefs’ Plan Stirs Debate, L.A. Times, Sept. 23, 2001, at 
California 1. 
 63. Id. 
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almost seems obvious to support the creation of a rigs-to-reefs 
program off the California coast.  In doing so, it is now possible to 
address the stakeholders’ concerns. 
The two overriding factors that led to the initial failure of a 
California rigs-to-reefs program under SB 1 were concerns over 
unjustly enriching oil companies as well as fears over long-term 
liability.  Both of these issues can be addressed together.  In a world 
where oil companies completely dismantle an offshore rig, they incur 
the full cost of removal.  However, post-removal, they are free from 
any long-term liability.  The opposite is true in the idealized rigs-to-
reefs program, likely hoped for by oil companies and equally vilified 
by environmental groups.  In reality, the MMS rigs-to-reefs program, 
as implemented in both Louisiana and Texas, requires the company 
converting the oil rig into a reef to donate a portion of the cost 
savings to the state, in order to cover the costs of managing the 
artificial reef.64  These payments are effectively treated as restitution.  
There is an opportunity, however, to use these payments to capture 
the liability issue.  Rather than viewing payments from an oil 
company to the state as restitution, they could be considered liability 
payments.  Rather than specifying a fixed amount of payment in all 
cases, a sliding scale should be created.  To facilitate administrative 
necessity, a base line amount is necessary.  Beyond that, however, the 
oil company should be free to, in essence, pick its poison between 
long-term liability and short-term financial gain.  This serves two 
crucial purposes.  First, it limits the state’s risk, by either placing 
liability solely upon the oil company or compensating the state for 
assuming the risk.  Additionally, it forces oil companies to analyze 
risks into the long-term, rather than just passing off a potential mess 
onto the state. 
If the proposal stopped right there and was otherwise identical to 
MMS’s current rigs-to-reefs program, the oil companies  would be the 
clear winners, gaining payment flexibility while retaining the ultimate 
flexibility to choose between complete dismantling of rigs or 
conversion into artificial reefs.  However, the refocused goal here is 
the preservation of coastal fisheries.  To that end, it seems imprudent 
to give oil companies a choice.  Instead, the determination of whether 
to convert a rig into a reef should come from NMFS.  This approach 
is consistent with NMFS’s mandate to create regional fishery 
management plans.  An important step should be added, however, to 
 
 64. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., supra note 50. 
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ensure that the decisions are fully informed.  For all intents and 
purposes, a lease for oil exploration rights is a major federal action 
and thus requires the production of an EIS.  However, an EIS is only 
required upon construction of an oil rig.65  Under the lease agreement, 
the oil company is required to eventually dismantle the rig 
completely.  This can only be avoided with an exception granted by 
MMS.  Granting a rigs-to-reefs exception should be considered a 
major federal action and thus require an EIS.  This will help provide a 
case-by-case analysis of rigs-to-reefs conversions, rather than 
promoting either a one-size-fits-all approach or allowing oil 
companies to dictate the process.  This should assuage the fears of 
environmental groups, distrustful of oil companies’ intentions, by 
ensuring federal oversight and a means to assign liability. 
Like the other stakeholders already discussed, the interests of 
commercial fishermen can also be accounted for.  The main concern 
presented was based on a fear of trawling equipment becoming 
caught on submerged structures.  Most proposed plans for converting 
rigs to reefs have oil companies remove the upper parts of the rig to a 
depth of 85 feet.  This, by itself, is unsatisfactory to commercial 
fishermen because trawlers often reach to depths of 300 feet.66  
Additionally, the removal of above surface identifiers makes it 
difficult for fishermen to locate reefs.  Unfortunately, the 85-foot 
level is essential for the growth of the rockfish population.  Juvenile 
rockfish seem to thrive at depths of 85 feet and below, making it an 
essential cut-off point.67  However, commercial fishermen are not at a 
loss.  Two opportunities present themselves.  First, injuries to 
commercial fishermen could be linked to the liability payment 
scheme discussed above by requiring either the state or the oil 
company, depending on the relative levels of liability, to both 
maintain above water identifiers, such as buoys, as well as potentially 
compensate the fishermen for the harm.  This ties into the second 
potential solution.  In addition to requiring EIS’s, the 1978 
amendments to the OCSLA created the Fishermen’s Contingency 
 
 65. Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Environmental Comment – Public Review (2006), 
http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/regulate/environ/nepa/nepaprocess.html. 
 66. John Richards, Commercial Fisheries: Long Term Effects of Offshore Oil and Gas 
Facilities Decommissioning, in Decommissioning and Removal of Oil and Gas Facilities 
Offshore California: Recent Experiences and Future Deepwater Challenges 111, 112 (Frank 
Manago & Bonnie Williamson, eds., 1997). 
 67. LOVE, supra note 58, at 4-11. 
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Fund.68  The fund exists for the purpose of compensating commercial 
fishermen who have been harmed by oil exploration in the outer 
continental shelf.  However, the fund only relates to active rigs, under 
the likely assumption that all other rigs would be completely 
dismantled.  This fund should be extended, however, to include oil 
rigs converted into artificial reefs, and injuries caused thereby.  With 
these two solutions, commercial fishermen will also see their interests 
addressed while maintaining focus on the protection of fish habit. 
The final stakeholders are the recreational fishers.  They bring 
strong support for the rigs-to-reefs program, so it is ironic that they 
should actually be limited in their activities.  Again, the purpose of 
rigs-to-reefs in California should be to protect rockfish populations.  
Allowing recreational fishermen unimpeded access to the fish stocks 
runs completely counter to this goal.  This limitation can be 
implemented through the Fisheries Management Plan.  Of all the 
groups to limit, recreational fishermen seem like they would be the 
least affected group.  The economic valuation of the recreational 
fishing industry came from a time without a rigs-to-reefs program, 
thus making it unclear whether limiting access to newly designated 
artificial reefs would have any effect on the industry.  In fact, NMFS 
has already begun to limit the direct fishing of the bocaccio species of 
rockfish.69  Additionally, the long-term effect will be the significant 
growth of the rockfish population, which should provide significant 
opportunities for recreational fishermen in the future. 
When pressed with what seem like intractable interests, it is 
essential to frame the debate around a common goal, in this case the 
protection of fisheries.  Through creative decision-making, solutions 
can present themselves in a way that all parties will find reasonable, 
even if not ideal.  Creating a formalized rigs-to-reefs program, while 
perhaps fraught with short-term negatives, will help sustain and 
potentially revitalize a once doomed fishery.  That is a goal that, in 
the long-term, will benefit all interested parties. 
 
 68. 43 U.S.C. § 1842 (2000). 
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